1.        Quad is an informal Strategic forum grouping of four democracies i.e. the United States, India, Japan, and Australia. The forum was formed in year 2007 but due to differing political affiliations and economic consideration particularly trade cooperation between Australia and Japan with China the QUAD ceased to exist. However, the forum got a fresh lease of life during the ASEAN Summit 2017 when all four founding members decided to revive the forum to counter the Chinese Silk Road initiative.

2.         China’s New Silk Road initiative constitutes one of the most ambitious projects in recent decades designed to change the pattern of the global economic division of labour as well as the geostrategic balance of power. It has the potential to create a new fabric of industrial value creation that links China and East Asia via Central and South Asia with Europe, and to forge new regional and multilateral institutions that complement or compete with existing regional and global governance systems. First proposed in 2013, the new initiative is only now starting to be rolled-out, with trade relations gradually intensifying, and the first investment projects and infrastructure clusters becoming manifest. However, the full impact of the evolving new regional value chains on global goods flows, investment activity, supra-national institution building, as well as their wider international implications, remains undetermined. This book brings together leading scholars from economics, political science and area studies, who present the latest cutting-edge knowledge and the latest state-of-the-art economic and political analysis on how the new initiative is developing and likely to develop.

3.     QUAD was perceived as the league of like-minded democracies converging across the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The Quadis symbiotically linked with the geopolitically ascending region, the Indo-Pacific. However, there are more questions than answers regarding structure, intentions and goals of the Quad at this moment, making it difficult for each member of the Quad to align their combined vision of the grouping with that of their individual visions of the Indo-Pacific. Stopgap sub-unions and disengagements at various levels in the Quad have raised questions as to whether the group can transcend into a productive mini-lateral arrangement. The other issue is whether Quad is capable of creating a potent security framework in the region.Though member nations have committed to the idea of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”, the cohesion of the group is still loosely arranged and has not yet been formalised to give unhindered assurance.

4.         The Indian Ocean along with the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca and the Arabian Sea are seen as being the “maritime lifeline” for Beijing because of China’s increasing demand for energy resources in order to sustain its economic growth. However, Beijingrealizesthey never had an overarching Indian Ocean strategy. To overcome this deficiency, China worked hard over the years to strengthen contacts with key countries in the region, including the most important multilateral institution, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). China’s collective bilateral trade contacts with the IORA countries at present are much higher than those of the other Quad-associated countries. Special commercial and strategic contacts have been established with some of the IORA members since they are central to China’s energy transportation in the Indian Ocean, particularly in the three chokepoints: Strait of Hormuz, Bab el Mandeb, and Strait of Malacca.

5.         Beijing’s approach has not only been how to overcome the challenges it faces in the Malacca Strait but also to find a new alternative medium of routes in the IOR and to combine it with emerging maritime strategy. Additionally, under Xi Jinping’s leadership, more autonomy, authority and power have been given to the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), where PLAN is emerging as one of the most powerful blue-water navies in the world. Indeed, the first-ever bluebook by Beijing, released in 2013, signalled how India’s Act East policy is a key challenging portent to China’s maritime interests in the IOR.

India’s Interests

6.         Quad 2.0 was almost a direct consequence of Doklam, even though the first statements on a “free and open Indo-Pacific” had been made by Shinzo Abe, Japanese PM. Post-Doklam, India agreed to tentative, “exploratory” meetings between senior officials of India, US, Japan and Australia, while Prime Minister Narendra Modi laid out the contours of India’s own Indo-Pacific policy at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2018. For a long time, India was reluctant to conflate its Indo-Pacific policy with the Quad, maintaining that the former was “bigger” and more “inclusive” than the latter. Every meeting ended with all four countries issuing their own statements, according to their own priorities, a telling sign that they were still not on the same page — however balancing China was the glue that held QUAD together.

7.         However, two things started to tip the balance. The first was the meeting of foreign ministers of Quad in September 2019 and the second wasthat India concluded logistics-sharing agreements with its Quad partners and France, which is India’s Indo-Pacific insurance policy. Thereafter, Covid and China’s creeping invasion in Ladakh happened. Covid not only showed that a virus originating in China could cripple the world, but that the world’s dependence on China was also rather debilitating. China’s invasion in Ladakh challenged India in ways it had not imagined earlier, leaving its relationship with China leaning on the reset button.

8.         New Delhi has tried to revitalize its maritime strategy in recent years. Initiatives such as Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR), the Cotton Routes, the Spice Routes, Project Mausam and an inter-continental consultative framework like the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) are intended to protect India’s commercial and maritime interests in the IOR. These initiatives aim at empowering India’s coastal provinces through the upgrading of infrastructure and by linking them strategically with the IOR countries. In order to restrict the rising Chinese influence, India has been attempting to concede as little strategic depth as possible to China in the IOR and therefore finds strategic consonance as a local power with the other Quad countries.

9.         Though India has traditional ties with most of the island states in the Indian Ocean Region, it has failed to leverage its strategic advantages. India’s island diplomacy has been one of confidence bordering on dismissal. When Prime Minister Narendra Modi toured Sri Lanka, Mauritius, and Seychelles in 2015, it was the first visit by an Indian head of government in over two decades.

10.       India’s military strengths lie in the northern and eastern Indian Ocean, with operational limitations specifically in the western Indian Ocean. If India is serious about playing a dominant role across the Indian Ocean region, it would have to step up its presence in the Gulf, western Indian Ocean, and the eastern coast of Africa.Indian efforts at building possible military infrastructure in Seychelles and Mauritius underlines Delhi’s understanding of its challenges in operating in those waters. India’s operational challenges could also be bridged through joint collaboration, such as logistics agreements with France and the United States. The French agreement can provide logistical support to Indian ships operating in the western Indian Ocean and the eastern coast of Africa through its bases in Djibouti, United Arab Emirates, and perhaps in the Mozambique Channel. India can explore similar engagements through the agreement with the United States. In the meantime, India will have to continue re-examining its relationship with Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius, and Seychelles to address the challenges in its island diplomacy.There was also the revival of the idea that Australia should join the annual Malabar naval exercises, which feature the navies of India, US and Japan. However, Covid put paid to that effort and the earliest Malabar Naval Exercise can now take place will be 2021. So if India finally overcomes her hesitation, the first steps to militarise the Quad will take shape. The Quad 1.0 (2007) as we realise was almost stillborn.In the post-Covid world, the Quad will, if it hasn’t already, become the most important grouping for India,both in terms of building alternative supply chains, collaborating on Covid treatments, vaccines, or even helping each other find their economic mojo again. It is in the area of defence and security that India will have to step off the fence and make some tough choices with regard to the Quad.Military and defence strategists have commented on the importance of building up Andaman & Nicobar Islands. Till date Japan is the only member of the Quad allowed in there. India might have to revisit this — if the US is developing Wake Island near Guam, there can be reciprocal options here in India. Especially if the Chinese are to be restricted in their access to SittwePort in Myanmar and Chittagong in Bangladesh, and, on a larger scale, in the Indian Ocean. Similarly, India will need better defensive posts in the Horn of Africa where it can challenge China more effectively. In the south-central Indian Ocean, the India-US and India-France relationships will stand us in good stead. Much greater investment is needed in Sri Lanka and Maldives. Should India be challenged on the Himalayas by China, which will probably not end anytime soon, India will have to take the battle to the oceans where it enjoys a slight advantage. T he future of Quad depends heavily on how the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific will play out. While concerns about CCP are a binding agent for the group, its members have also frequently stressed that the purpose is not a simple containment strategy targeted against China. That said, continued aggression from the CCP and its pursuit of “wolf-warrior diplomacy” will continue to provide a reason for the group to exist and perhaps motivation to evolve.For that, the Quad is invaluableand fits in well with India’s new strategic policy.